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Current Circuit Splits 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of circuit splits identified by 
a federal court of appeals opinion between February 25, 2008 and 
October 8, 2008. This collection is organized by civil and criminal 
matters, then by subject matter. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is intended 
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a comprehensive 
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will 
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point. 
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CIVIL MATTERS 
CONSTITUTIONAL/FEDERAL LAW 
 
First Amendment – Freedom of Speech: DeJohn v. Temple 
University, 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008)  
The 3rd Circuit addressed the issues of whether the university’s 
policy on Sexual Harassment is facially constitutional and whether the 
question of the constitutionality of the policy is moot. Id. at 304.  The 
court held that the policy is facially unconstitutional and that the 
constitutionality of the policy is not moot.  Id.  In reaching this holding, 
the court noted that although Temple voluntarily amended the contested 
policy, the court had “no assurance that Temple will not re-implement its 
pre-January 15 sexual harassment policy, absent an injunction.”  Id. at 
309. The court reached this conclusion because “Temple did not change 
its sexual harassment policy for more than a year after the 
commencement of litigation” and “Temple . . . continues to defend . . . 
the need for the former policy.”  Id. The court observed that the 11th 
Circuit treats the issue of mootness differently.  Id. at 311.  The 11th 
Circuit reasoned that an issue is moot if the new policy appears “to have 
been the result of substantial deliberation.” Id. Although using a different 
rationale, the 3rd Circuit did not believe that its “conclusion is at odds 
with that of the Eleventh Circuit” because the record “does not support 
an assessment that Temple’s policy change was the result of substantial 
deliberation.” Id. In addition, in reaching the court’s holding that the 
policy is facially unconstitutional, the 3rd Circuit noted that Temple’s 
policy was overbroad because it could suppress protected speech.  Id. at 
314–15. 
 
Copyright Infringement – Doctrine of Laches Barring a Claim: 
Peter Letterese & Assocs. Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 
533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008)  
The 11th Circuit dealt with both a circuit split and an issue of first 
impression on “whether the equitable doctrine of laches may bar a claim 
for copyright infringement that was filed within the statute of 
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limitations.” Id. at 1319.  The 11th Circuit modified the approach 
followed by the 4th Circuit, which holds, unqualifiedly, that the doctrine 
of laches “may [never] be interposed in a copyright infringement case.  
Id. at 1320.  The 11th Circuit remained mindful of the “separation of 
powers principles which counsel against the use of ‘the judicially created 
doctrine of laches to bar a federal statutory claim that has been timely 
filed under an express statute of limitations.’” Id.  The court also pointed 
out that the purpose of laches, before Congress instituted a 3 year statute 
of limitations, was to prevent the inequity of the owner of a copyright, 
with full notice of an intended infringement, being able to stand inactive 
while the infringer spends money, only to intervene when it is successful.  
Id.  In essence, laches was applied to ensure timely filings and with the 
onset of the statute of limitations it is simply not as important. Id.  
However, the court limited its agreement with the 4th Circuit and instead 
of an “unqualified no,” the 11th Circuit held that “there is a strong 
presumption that a plaintiff’s suit is timely if it is filed before the statute 
of limitations has run.” Id.  Nevertheless, even though it opened itself to 
some chance that laches could be invoked, it still held that “[o]nly in the 
most extraordinary circumstances will laches be recognized as a 
defense.” Id. 
 
Standing – Third Party Beneficiaries to Consent Decrees: 
United States v. FMC Corp., 531 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2008)  
The 9th circuit carved out an exception to the sweeping conclusion 
that “Blue Chip Stamps prohibits only incidental third party beneficiaries 
from suing to enforce a consent decree” and therefore “intended 
beneficiaries may.”  Id. at 820.  The court noted that “[m]ost other 
circuits are in accord with [its] restrictive reading of the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Blue Chip.  Id.  Other circuits, such as the 6th Circuit, have 
interpreted Blue Chip in its plain language and will so hold “until the 
Supreme Court revisits the unequivocal language of Blue Chip.” Id.   The 
9th Circuit therefore held in the instant case that their restrictive 
reasoning will stand. Id. As a result, the Tribes, who were trying to prove 
that they were intended beneficiaries, were deemed to instead be 
incidental beneficiaries and were not allowed to sue to enforce the 
government’s consent decree.  Id. 
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CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
Post-Verdict Hearings – Rule 606(b): U.S. v. Honken, 541 F.3d 
1146 (8th Cir. 2008)  
The 8th Circuit joined the analyses of the 2nd and 7th Circuits in 
holding that Rule 606(b) “prohibits a juror from testifying at a post-
verdict hearing as to whether extraneous information or an outside 
influence affected that juror’s ability to be impartial.” Id. at 1169.  The 
court noted that Rule 606(b) does allow a juror to testify as to whether 
prejudicial information was brought to the jury’s attention, however it 
prohibits the juror from testifying as “to the effect of anything upon that 
or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to 
or dissent from the verdict . . . .” Id.  In contrast, the 6th Circuit and the 
9th Circuit have found that district courts abuse their discretion when 
they do not ask whether jurors were exposed to outside influences and 
whether it affected their ability to be impartial.  Id. at 1168.  Although 
the 8th Circuit had not previously had a case specifically addressing this 
issue, the court held it was improper for the district court to ask the juror 
what effect her boss’s comments had on her ability to be impartial.  Id. at 
1169. 
 
Rule 60(b) Relief – Cross-Circuit Vacation of Judgment by a 
Registering Court: Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244 (3d 
Cir. 2008)  
The 3rd Circuit addressed the question of whether a registering 
district court may grant Rule 60(b) relief from a different district’s 
rendering court, in cases where relief is not based on the rendering 
court’s lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction nor where relief is 
sought from a default judgment.  Id. at 251.  The 1st Circuit has held that 
under Fed R. Civ. Proc. 60(b), a defendant against whom judgment has 
been entered in a federal court may request to have that judgment 
vacated in the federal court of another district only when the judgment is 
based on grounds that might support an independent equitable action, or 
when the relief requested is from a default judgment.  Id. at 252.  The 
10th Circuit has also recognized that a registering court may grant relief 
from a rendering court’s default judgment.  Id. at 253.  The 5th Circuit 
has similarly held that a registering court could vacate a rendering 
court’s default judgment but, in dicta, expressed reservations about a 
registering court’s authority to vacate a judgment for any other reason.  
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Id.  The 7th Circuit has held that a registering court may annul a 
rendering court’s judgment only on the basis that the rendering court 
lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 253.  In the present 
case, the 3rd Circuit expressly declined to “adopt a rule that categorically 
forbids district courts from vacating the judgment” of a rendering court 
in cases where the judgment was on the merits, rather than a default 
judgment. Id. at 254.  The majority held that under certain “extraordinary 
circumstances,” registering courts may vacate foreign judgments.  Id.  
The majority did not reach the question of what might constitute 
“extraordinary circumstances.”  Id. at 255. 
 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Involuntary Bankruptcy 
Petitions: Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC v. Morrison Agency 
Inc., 525 F.3d 1095 (11th Cir. 2008)  
The 11th Circuit reluctantly joined the 2nd Circuit in holding that 
the 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) requirements for filing an involuntary bankruptcy 
petition must be satisfied to “bestow upon the bankruptcy courts subject 
matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 1098. The court noted that the “prior precedent 
rule” restricted the court’s ability to join the 9th Circuit and “most courts 
to consider the issue” that hold the 303(b) requirements not to be 
jurisdictional in nature.  Id. at 1101, 1107.  The court concluded that both 
the “bona fide dispute” and “three-petitioning creditor” requirements 
“must be satisfied in order for a bankruptcy court to have subject matter 
jurisdiction” over involuntary bankruptcy proceedings.  Id. at 1101. 
 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
Attorney’s Fees – Awards by the Social Security 
Administration: Clark v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2008)  
The 9th Circuit joined the 6th and 10th Circuits, both of which have 
“held § 406(b)’s cap on attorney’s fees applies only to fees awarded 
under § 406(b), and does not limit the combined fees awarded under both 
§ 406(a) and § 406(b).”  Id. at 1215.  Finding the language of the statute 
clear on its face, the 9th Circuit disagreed with the approach of the 4th 
and 5th Circuits which read into the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 406(b).  Id. at 1216.  The 4th and 5th Circuits have held that § 406(b) 
limits the combined attorney’s fees awarded under both § 406(a) and 
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§ 406(b) to 25% of the claimant’s past-due benefits.  Id.  In rejecting the 
holdings of the 4th and 5th Circuits, the 9th Circuit reasoned that when 
the statutory text is clear on its face, legislative history is unnecessary in 
reaching a conclusion. Id. at 1216.  Further, while the 4th and 5th 
Circuits held to the contrary, based on the 1968 amendment to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 406(a), which they read to prohibit the Secretary of the Social Security 
Administration from authorizing an award of attorney’s fees under § 
406(a) in excess of 25% of past-due benefits, the 9th Circuit determined 
that “Congress chose not to impose a categorical ceiling on the 
Administration’s authority to award attorney’s fees for representation 
before the Administration.”  Id. at 1218. 
 
Debtor Creditor Law – Setting Aside Fraudulent Conveyance: 
Eberhard v. Marcu, 530 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2008)  
The 2nd Circuit determined “a receiver cannot employ § 276 of 
New York’s Debtor & Creditor Law to set aside a fraudulent conveyance 
where he represents only the transferor.” Id. at 126.  In examining if 
receivers ever have the authority to pursue fraudulently conveyed assets, 
the 2nd Circuit followed the 7th Circuit’s determination that “receivers 
have standing . . . only when one of the entities in receivership is a 
creditor of the transferor.” Id. at 132. The 7th Circuit based its 
determination on a case in which a district court appointed a receiver to 
represent the creator of three corporations and his partners, who then 
sought to recover assets conveyed to third parties.  Id.  The 7th Circuit 
determined that the receiver was not suing on behalf of the investors but 
on behalf of the corporations, who were deemed distinct legal entities 
with the fiduciary duty to recover assets fraudulently conveyed.  Id.  
Further, the court found that the corporation founder controlled them 
completely at the time of the fraudulent transfer, making the transfer 
coerced.  Id.  The 2nd Circuit agreed and concluded “that a receiver’s 
standing to bring a fraudulent conveyance claim will turn on whether he 
represents the transferor only or also represents a creditor of the 
transferor.”  Id. at 133. 
 
Investment Company Act of 1940 – Excessive Fees and 
Fiduciary Duty: Jones v. Harris Assoc. L.P., 537 F.3d 728 (7th 
Cir. 2008) 
The 2nd Circuit has determined that a court may consider whether a 
fee charged by an investment advisor is “so disproportionately large that 
it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not 
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have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining” when determining if 
the investment company has breached its fiduciary duty under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940.  Id. at 729.  However, in this case, the 
7th Circuit disagreed with the approach established by the 2nd Circuit.  
Id. Rather, the 7th Circuit held that a “fiduciary must make full 
disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on 
compensation.”  Id.  The court felt that it should be the trustees and 
investors who determine how much the services rendered are worth.  Id.  
The court opined that the market is sufficient to control the prices that 
are being charged—investors have plenty of mutual funds to choose 
from, and they compete with each other to provide their investors with 
the best combination of service and pricing.  Id.  The court noted that 
trustees owe “an obligation of candor in negotiation, and honesty in 
performance” to fulfill their fiduciary obligation, however, this does not 
require them to place a cap on the fees that are charged.  Id. 
  
FRCP – Availability of Appellate Review for Postremoval 
Remands Based on Declining Supplemental Jurisdiction: Cal. 
Dep’t of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 
2008) 
The plaintiff in this case argued that the Court of Appeals was 
precluded from reviewing the district court’s order remanding the case to 
the California court.  Id. at 1091.  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), an 
order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is 
unreviewable only if the remand is based on defects in removal 
procedure or on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which are the class of 
remands described in § 1447(c).  Id.  In the instant case, the district court 
identified 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) as the source of its authority to remand, 
and explicitly stated that it was declining to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction. While the Federal Circuit has split with several circuits by 
holding that a remand based on declining supplemental jurisdiction must 
be considered within the remands described in § 1447(c) and thus barred 
from appellate review by § 1447(d), the 9th Circuit declined to support 
the Federal Circuit’s conclusion.  Id. at 1092.  Rather, the 9th Circuit 
held that a district court’s order remanding pendent state claims on 
discretionary grounds is not pursuant to § 1447(c) and is therefore 
reviewable.  Id. at 1091. 
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Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act – Private 
Right of Action Unrelated to Vehicle Mileage: Bodine v. Graco, 
Inc., 533 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 2008) 
The 9th Circuit recognized a divergence among the 7th and 11th 
Circuits when interpreting the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost 
Savings Act (“Odometer Act”), 49 U.S.C. §§ 32701–32711 to “allow a 
private right of action where the fraud relates to something other than the 
vehicle’s mileage.”  Id. at 1147.  The 9th Circuit joined the 7th Circuit, 
concluding “that the private right of action under the Odometer Act is 
limited to allegations of fraud relating to a vehicle’s mileage,” and 
rejected the 11th Circuit’s interpretation that “no such limit exists.”  Id. 
at 1147, 1151.  The court first noted that both the 7th and 11th Circuits 
looked to “the plain language of the statute,” and yet reached “directly 
opposite conclusions.”  Id. at 1150.  Though the court recognized that 
§ 32710, which requires a violation with intent to defraud in the private 
cause of action, “is not intrinsically limited” when “studied in isolation,” 
the court looked at the context of the statutory scheme.  Id. at 1152.  
Addressing the “list of Congress’s findings and purposes” at the 
beginning of the statutory scheme, the court found that the purposes 
speak “specifically of odometer fraud,” and contain “not a single 
statutory phrase that suggests Congress wished to reach additional types 
of fraud.”  Id. at 1148, 1151.  Therefore, the court the court refused the 
11th Circuit’s broad interpretation by identifying “no cogent reason why 
Congress would fastidiously restrict the substantive reach of the Act to 
odometer fraud, while making §32710(a) liability turn on intent to 
commit any type of fraud.”  Id. at 1152 (emphasis in original). 
 
Federal Telecommunications Act – No Private Right of Action 
in FTA § 253(a) Enforceable Under § 1983: Southwestern Bell 
Tel., L.P. v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2008) 
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzaga Univ. v. 
Doe, which held that “where the text and structure of a statute provide no 
indication that Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is 
no basis for a private suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied 
right of action,” the 5th Circuit held that §§ 253(a) and (c) of the Federal 
Telecommunications Act did not create a private cause of action.  Id. at 
261. Section 253(a) “proscribes state and local governments from 
prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide telecommunications 
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service,” while § 253(c) is a “safe-harbor provision preserving a 
government’s power to manage its public rights-of-way.” Id. at 259.  
Acknowledging a three-to-two circuit split on the issue of whether these 
sections provide for a private right of action, the Court noted that the two 
circuits that recognized a private right of action under § 253 had 
recognized that right prior to the Gonzaga decision. Conversely, the three 
circuits that had declined to find a private right of action had all issued 
their rulings after the Gonzaga decision. These holdings were also 
consistent with the 5th Circuit’s own previous holding that a federal 
statute must “unambiguously give rise to privately enforceable, 
substantive rights.”  Id.  After examining the text of the relevant sections 
of the Federal Telecommunications Act, the court determined that 
“Congress did not intend to create a private right enforceable under § 
1983.”  Id. at 262.  Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of Southwestern Bell’s claims.  Id. at 264. 
 
 
Rehabilitation Act – Standard of Causation Requirement for § 
501: Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 2008) 
The 5th Circuit agreed with the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th 
Circuits regarding whether the standard of causation between disability 
discrimination and employment decisions under the American 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) requires a showing that termination was based 
solely on the injured party’s disability.  Id. at 515–16, 518–19.  These 
seven circuits hold that the “solely” restriction cannot be read into § 501 
of the Rehabilitation Act because a plain reading of the ADA’s causation 
standard “‘conveys the idea of a factor that made a difference in the 
outcome,’ not one that was necessarily the ‘sole cause’ of the outcome.”  
Id. at 518–19.  The 6th Circuit has disagreed with this approach, instead 
“holding that, despite contrary law in other circuits, in the Sixth Circuit 
an ADA plaintiff must show that her disability was the ‘sole reason’ for 
the employer’s adverse employment action.”  Id. at n.30.  Here, the 5th 
Circuit determined that the court must apply the same causation standard 
to claims brought under both the ADA and § 501 of the Rehabilitation 
Act.  Id. at 517.  Consequently, the 5th Circuit held that “sole causation” 
is not required under the ADA standard and instead chose to adopt the 
rule, in accordance with the majority of circuits, that “[u]nder the ADA, 
‘discrimination need not be the sole reason for the adverse employment 
decision, [but] must actually play a role in the employer’s decision 
making process and have a determinative influence on the outcome.’”  
Id. at 519. 
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CERCLA – Standard of Review for Apportionment of 
Liability: United States v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co., 520 F.3d. 918 (9th Cir. 2008)  
The 9th Circuit held that a district court can apportion liability 
among tortfeasors under CERCLA.  Id. at 934.  The court adopted the 
Chem-Dyne standard, finding that “[a]s Chem-Dyne persuasively 
recounts, the history of § 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), 
indicates that although Congress declined to mandate joint and several 
liability, it did not intend by doing so ‘a rejection of joint and severable 
liability.’”  Id. at 935.  In developing standards of apportionment and 
when apportionment is necessary, the court looked to the 4th, 5th, 6th 
and 10th Circuits for guidance.  Id. As to the appellate standard of 
review, the court acknowledged a split among the 5th, 8th, and 6th 
Circuits. “The Fifth and Eighth Circuits look first to whether there is a 
reasonable basis for apportioning the harm, an inquiry they consider a 
question of law reviewed de novo.”  Id. at 941.   “These two circuits then 
examine, as a question of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard, precisely how damages are to be divided.” Id. The court 
observed that, “[i]n contrast, the Sixth Circuit considers divisibility as a 
whole a factual matter of causation, reviewed entirely under the clearly 
erroneous standard. This view, however, disregards a distinction between 
conceptual divisibility and actual allocation that we find both persuasive 
and useful.”  Id. at 941–42.  The court noted that “[t]he latter inquiry can 
involve the resolution of credibility issues and of conflicting evidence, 
while the former ordinarily does not.” Id. at 942. The 9th Circuit adopted 
the approach used by the 5th and 8th Circuits and reversed the lower 
court because the record did not support a finding for apportionment.  Id. 
at 942. 
 
Clean Air Act – Establishing Appellate Jurisdiction on Appeal: 
United States v. Grace, 526 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 2008) 
The 9th Circuit overturned its own precedent and joined the 3rd, 
4th, 7th and 8th Circuits in holding that a United States Attorney’s 
personal certification that an appeal was not taken for the purpose of 
delay and that the evidence is substantial proof of a fact material in the 
proceeding was sufficient for purposes of establishing our jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3731.  Id. at 506.  The court held that the plain 
language of the statute showed Congress’s intent that, as long as the 
other requirements of § 3731 are present, the mere certification regarding 
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the delay and materiality prerequisites is all the statute required to invoke 
appellate jurisdiction.  Id.  Specifically, the court noted the phrasing of § 
3731—“An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals . . . 
if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal 
is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial 
proof of a fact material in the proceeding.”  Id.  In fact, the court noted 
that it had been the only Circuit to further require that the evidence 
suppressed by the district court was actually material to the upcoming 
trial.  Id. 
 
CRIMINAL MATTERS 
CONSTITUTIONAL/FEDERAL ISSUES 
Pornography – Supervised Released Condition: United States v. 
Wilkinson, 282 Fed. Appx. 750 (11th Cir. 2008) 
The 11th Circuit examined whether Special Condition 7 of 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), which requires that defendants who have plead 
guilty to transporting and shipping child pornography not possess any 
pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating material or 
patronize establishments where such materials are available, is vague, 
overbroad, and unduly restrictive of a defendant’s First Amendment 
rights.  Id. at 753–54.  In determining whether the term “pornography” 
used in Special Condition 7 is unconstitutionally vague, the 11th Circuit 
looked toward the Supreme Court, which has not ruled on the issue, and 
other circuits.  Id. at 754.  The 9th and 3rd Circuits have determined that 
the supervised release condition restricting possession of “any 
pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials” was 
unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 754.  However, the 5th, 8th, and 9th 
Circuits have concluded that the supervised release condition is not 
unconstitutionally vague and does not violate the First Amendment.  Id.  
The 11th Circuit determined that “[b]ecause neither the Supreme Court 
nor this Court has addressed [whether] “pornography” is an 
unconstitutionally vague term] and other circuits differ in their holdings, 
[the defendant could not] show that the district court committed plain 
error by imposing Special Condition 7 as a term of his supervised 
release.”  Id. 
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Unconstitutional Imprisonment – Favorable Termination 
Requirement: Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2008) 
The 4th Circuit allowed a plaintiff to bring a claim for 
unconstitutional imprisonment under § 1983, even though it was no 
longer possible to meet the favorable termination requirement of Heck v. 
Humphrey via a habeas action, since the plaintiff was already released.  
Id. at 263.  The 4th Circuit disagreed with the 1st, 5th, and 8th Circuits, 
which “interpret Heck as barring individuals from filing virtually all 
§ 1983 claims unless the favorable termination requirement is met.” Id. 
at 267.  The 4th Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 11th 
Circuits, and reasoned that the “sweeping breadth, high purposes, and 
uniqueness of § 1983 would be compromised in an unprincipled manner 
if it could not be applied . . . to a habeas ineligible former prisoner.”  Id. 
at 267–68. 
 
Fourth Amendment – Standard of Review for Challenges 
Alleging that a Police Search Exceeded the Scope of 
Defendant’s Consent: United States v. Pikyavit, 527 F.3d 1126 
(10th Cir. 2008) 
The 10th Circuit adopted to review a district court’s factual findings 
for “clear error” under the totality of circumstances when considering 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge to a police search that he 
alleged exceeded the scope of his consent.  Id. at 1129.  In so doing, the 
10th Circuit rejected the 1st Circuit’s selection of a standard other than 
clear error, calling the distinction “illusory” since “every case notes the 
fact-intensive nature of the inquiry and the deference given to the lower 
court’s determination.”  Id. at n.1.  To this end, the court cited cases from 
the 2nd, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 11th Circuits and noted that the 5th Circuit 
itself emphasized the centrality of “factual circumstances surrounding the 
consent . . . to determine the nature of the consent and how it would have 
been viewed by a reasonable person.” Id. Therefore, the court concluded 
that unless the district court’s determination is clearly erroneous, that is, 
unless there is a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made” or “two permissible views of the evidence” are not possible, the 
district court’s determination will be upheld.  Id. at 1130. 
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Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) – 
Requirement of Nexus with the United States: United States v. 
Estrada-Obregon, 270 Fed. Appx. 978 (11th Cir. 2008) 
The 11th Circuit addressed the issue of whether “the MDLEA 
requires a nexus between a foreign-registered vessel and the United 
States” in order to establish jurisdiction. Id. at 981. The court 
acknowledged that the 1st and 3rd Circuits “have held that no nexus is 
required when the flag nation consents to the enforcement of U.S. law.”  
Id. at 981 n.1.  In contrast, the 2nd and 9th Circuits required “a nexus 
between conduct on foreign-registered vessels and the United States 
analogous to the minimum contacts required for personal jurisdiction.”  
Id.  The court noted that “there is no binding precedent clearly holding 
the MDLEA requires a nexus between a foreign-registered vessel and the 
United States.”  Id.  Furthermore, the court referred to its decision in 
United States v. Mena where the court suggested there was no nexus 
requirement.  Id. at 981.  The court joined the 1st and 3rd circuits in not 
requiring nexus and therefore held that there was no plain error “by the 
district court in not dismissing the case for lack of nexus.”  Id. 
 
SENTENCING 
 
Sentencing Guidelines – “Extraordinary Cases” Where Both an 
Upward and Downward Adjustment May Be Warranted: 
United States v. Swanson, 284 Fed. Appx. 365 (7th Cir. 2008) 
The 7th Circuit noted that the circuits are split as to how to analyze 
whether a case is “extraordinary” under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual § 3C.1, which would allow a district court to increase a 
defendant’s offense level for obstruction of justice and also decrease the 
offense level for significant acceptance of responsibility.  Id. at 368.  
However, 3rd Circuit’s law was already settled and in the company of 
the majority of the courts of appeals that have rejected the 9th Circuit’s 
position, which allows an obstructive defendant to earn the acceptance of 
responsibility discount just by pleading guilty and thereafter refraining 
from obstructing justice further.  Id.  The 7th Circuit has previously held 
that a defendant has not accepted responsibility, let alone extraordinarily 
so, when he initially cooperates but later obstructs justice, or when he 
lies to authorities to conceal certain details of his crime while otherwise 
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“cooperating.” Id.  Although there may be some limited circumstances in 
which an obstructive defendant has nonetheless accepted responsibility, 
the court must examine the timing and nature of the defendant’s conduct 
to form such a conclusion.  Id. 
 
Ex Post Facto Clause – Sentencing Guidelines: United States v. 
Andrews, 532 F.3d 900 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
The D.C. Circuit considered whether the use of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced 
violates the ex post facto clause if it yields a harsher penalty than the 
manual that was in effect on the date of the offense.  Id. at 908.  The 
court gave great weight to the Supreme Court declaration that the 
guidelines are advisory, rather than mandatory. Id. at 909.  The court 
noted that the 6th, 7th, and 11th Circuits concluded that since the 
guidelines are not mandatory, using a later manual does not violate the ex 
post facto clause, while the 1st, 3rd, 8th, and 9th Circuits concluded that 
the clause would be violated if the latter manual yields a higher penalty.  
Id.  The D.C. Circuit declined to address the issue, and instead relied on 
the circuit split to hold that the district court did not make plain error in 
using the manual in effect on the date of sentencing.  Id. 
 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
Statutory Interpretation – Mens Rea Requirement of 
Knowledge: United States v. Khattab, 536 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2008)  
The 6th Circuit declined to adopt sister circuit interpretations of the 
mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), which makes it illegal 
for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess or distribute “a 
listed chemical knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the 
listed chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled substance . . . .”  
Id. at 768.  The court noted that there is a split among the circuits 
regarding the proper interpretation of the statute’s mens rea requirement.  
Id. at 769.  The court compared the 10th Circuit’s approach, which holds 
that “the statute requires a defendant’s subjective knowledge that the 
drugs he possesses or distributes will be used to manufacture a controlled 
substance” with the approach taken by the 8th, 9th, and 11th Circuits that 
“allow(s) conviction based upon either subjective knowledge or an 
objective ‘cause to believe.’” Id.  However, the 7th Circuit declined to 
adopt either approach because evidence supported the district court’s 
208 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:191 
conclusion that the defendant “actually knew that the pseudoephedrine 
he attempted to purchase . . . would be used to manufacture 
methamphetamine.” Id. Instead, the 7th Circuit concluded that the 
defendant’s “actual knowledge constitutes mens rea under either 
approach.”  Id. 
 
Federal Appointment Statute – Clemency under State Law: 
Hood v. Quarterman, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16642 (5th Cir. 2008) 
The 5th Circuit addressed the issue of whether “the federal 
appointment statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3599, provides prisoners sentenced 
under state law the right to federally appointed and funded counsel to 
pursue clemency under state law.”  Id. at *1. The court held that the 
“statute does not apply to state clemency proceedings.”  Id.  However, 
the court noted that there was a split among the circuits on this issue.  Id.  
The 10th Circuit disagrees with the 5th Circuit by stating that “counsel 
appointed to represent state death row inmate . . . must represent the 
defendant through every subsequent stage of available judicial 
proceedings including . . . clemency.”  Id.  The 10th Circuit clarifies that 
by “clemency,” it means “state clemency proceedings given that federal 
officials have no authority to commute a state court sentence.”  Id. 
 
Deportation Statutes – Tax Fraud as a Removable Offense: 
Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171 (5th Cir. 2008) 
The 5th Circuit joined the 9th Circuit in holding that an alien’s 
“prior conviction for filing false federal tax return” qualifies as a 
removable offense.  Id. at 173.  The court assessed the opposite 
conclusion held by the 3rd Circuit, stating that “we cannot agree that 
Congress intended to exclude tax offenses involving fraud and deceit” 
from those tax crimes that constitute an “aggravated felony.”  Id. at 173, 
175.  The court found the term “aggravated felony” unambiguous and 
held that Congress did not intend for the inclusion of tax evasion “among 
aggravated felonies to the exclusion of other tax felonies.”  Id. at 174.  
The court concluded that a “conviction under 26 U.S.C § 7206(1) for 
filing a false tax return constitutes an aggravated felony” and may 
support removal of an alien.  Id. at 173. 
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Federal Criminal Forfeiture – Restraint of Substitute Assets: 
United States v. Parrett, 530 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2008) 
Federal criminal forfeiture law indentifies two types of assets: those 
that have been tainted by criminal activity (“tainted”) and those that are 
free of such taint (“substitute”).  Id. at 429.  When an asset is tainted by 
certain types of criminal activity, criminal forfeiture proceedings can be 
instituted on it.  Id.  Furthermore, Congress gave federal prosecutors the 
power to request that the district court “enter a restraining order or 
injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or 
take any other action to preserve the availability of this property” 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(e). Id.  There is also a timing provision 
under § 853(c) called “relation back” which allows the government’s 
interest in any tainted property to vest when the defendant commits the 
act giving rise to the forfeiture. Currently the circuits are split as to 
whether the government’s interest in substitute property (that which is 
not tainted and is reserved for the government if the interest in the tainted 
property is sold or otherwise lost before a conviction and subsequent 
forfeiture order) relates back to the date of the act giving rise to the 
forfeiture in same way as tainted property.  Id. at 430.  The 10th Circuit 
“focuses on the plain language of § 853, holding that the federal 
government has only a ‘potential and speculative future interest’ in 
substitute assets prior to a conviction.”  Id.  The 4th Circuit, by contrast, 
reads § 853 “in light of what it consider[s] to be the statute’s broader 
purpose; it held that because the purpose of relation back was to ‘prevent 
defendants from escaping the impact of forfeiture by transferring assets 
to third parties’ . . . the forfeiture of substitute property ‘relates back to 
the date of the acts giving rise to the forfeiture.’” Id. The 6th Circuit 
followed the majority rule outlined by the 10th Circuit and held that “the 
plain language of 21 U.S.C. § 853 conveys Congress’ intent to authorize 
the restraint of tainted assets prior to trial, but not the restrain of 
substitute assets.”  Id. at 431. 
 
Right of Defendants To Refuse Medication – Seriousness Of 
Victimless Crimes: United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 
2008) 
The 6th Circuit adopted the 4th Circuit standard for determining the 
seriousness of a crime for the purposes of a Sell analysis, and held that a 
crime would be considered serious if the maximum statutory penalty for 
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the offense is at least ten years of incarceration. Id. at 549.  The court 
rejected the defendant’s argument that Sell limited the definition of 
“serious crime” to violent and property crimes, and stated that the phrase 
“whether the offense is a serious crime against the person or a serious 
crime against property” used in Sell does not preclude other types of 
crime from being serious.  Id. at 551.  Further, the court disapproved of a 
district court case from the 5th Circuit that deemed a particular crime not 
serious because it was not directed at either person or property, and sided 
with the 10th Circuit, which held that a crime could be serious even if it 
was not “violent or harmful to others.” Id. at 550. Although the 
defendant argued that the statutory sentence for his crimes was arbitrarily 
enhanced due to the presence of crack cocaine and, therefore, should not 
be used to determine the seriousness of his crimes, the 6th Circuit 
concluded that “[b]y utilizing the potential statutory penalty to assess the 
seriousness of a crime, we employ an objective standard for application 
and thereby avoid any arbitrary determinations, and further, respect the 
judgment of the legislative branch as reflective of societal attitudes.”  Id. 
at 549. 
 
Criminal Sentencing Statutes – “Except” Clause of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A): United States v. Whitley, 529 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 
2008) 
The 2nd Circuit considered whether to interpret the “except” clause 
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) literally, rendering a ten-year minimum 
consecutive sentence imposed under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and § 
924(c)(1)(D)(ii) inapplicable by virtue of § 924(e), which subjects a 
defendant to a minimum fifteen-year sentence.  Id. at 153.  The court 
recognized that the 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th Circuits rejected a literal 
interpretation of the clause.  Id. at 156.  While reluctant to “precipitate a 
circuit split,” the court concluded that “there are substantial grounds for 
doing so.”  Id.  First, the court emphasized that “we have repeatedly been 
instructed to give statutes a literal reading and apply the plain meaning of 
the words Congress has used . . . Indeed, the Supreme Court has reversed 
a court of appeals for not giving a literal reading to another provision of 
section 924(c).” Id. at 156.  Second, the court stated that “case law 
rejecting a literal reading of the ‘except’ clause was initiated . . . on the 
unexplained argument . . . that a literal reading would render section 
924(c) ‘grammatically and conceptually incomplete.’”  Id. at 157.  Third, 
the court noted that “four of the five decisions rejecting a literal reading 
of the ‘except’ clause did not involve a defendant . . . subject to a 
minimum fifteen-year sentence” as required by § 924(e).  Id.  Only the 
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4th Circuit rejected a literal interpretation of the “except” clause as 
applied to a defendant sentenced under § 924(e); however, as the court 
noted, the 4th Circuit interpreted the “except” clause “to exempt 
minimum sentence requirements only where another provision provides 
‘an even greater mandatory minimum consecutive sentence for a 
violation of § 924(c).’” Id. The court thus rejected such a statutory 
interpretation, noting that the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Rodriguez “condemn[ed] the insertion of words into a statute as ‘not 
faithful to the statutory text.’” Id. As such, the court adopted a literal 
interpretation of the “except” clause of § 924(c)(1)(A).  Id. at 158. 
 
Touching in Rude or Angry Manner – Not a Crime of Violence: 
U.S. v. Hays, 526 F.3d 674 (10th Cir. 2008) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether a misdemeanor conviction of 
domestic violence under a Wyoming statute was an adequate predicate 
conviction for firearm possession under a federal statute.  Id. at 676.  The 
defendant was indicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9) and 924 (a)(2) for 
possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a “misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence” under the Wyoming statute.  Id. at 675.  The 
term “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” was defined in the 
federal statute as an offense that “has, as an element, the use or attempted 
use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.”  Id.  
Under the Wyoming statute, however, a person could be convicted of 
simple battery “if he unlawfully touches another in a rude, insolent, or 
angry manner . . . .”  Id.  Noting a split between the circuits, the 10th 
Circuit held that context presented in Wyoming’s battery statute did not 
satisfy the “use of physical force” element necessary for a predicate 
conviction under the federal statute, because it included “conduct that is 
minimally forcible, though ungentlemanly.”  Id. at 680–82.  Citing 7th 
and 9th Circuit precedent as instructive, and looking also to supporting 
congressional history, the 10th Circuit found that “physical force” 
required more than de minimis touching.  Id. at 681.  The court followed 
the 9th Circuit’s reasoning that the federal statute’s “use or attempted use 
of physical force” language did not intend to include as predicate 
offenses “mere impolite behavior,” but instead contemplated the type of 
“gravely serious” use of physical force associated with the phrase 
“threatened use of a deadly weapon.”  Id. at 679.  The court also noted a 
7th Circuit finding that a conception of physical violence that includes de 
minimis touching “collaps[es] the distinction between violent and non-
violent offenses.”  Id. at 681.   Although the 10th Circuit noted that the 
1st, 8th, and 11th Circuits’ contrary holdings might be “correct from a 
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scientific perspective,” it concluded that, from a legal perspective, 
physical force in a crime of violence must entail more than mere contact.  
Id.  Otherwise, de minimis touching could give federal statutes like the 
one in question an overly broad scope and impact.  Id. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
